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B. California Tax Practitioners Beware: Even the
Ninth Circuit's I.R.C. Section 1031 Loophole Has
Limits
Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code provides tax deferred status for
like-kind exchanges of investment property. The Deficit Reduction Act of
1984 amends this section to curb the use of the controversial delayed exchange
as a tool to suspend tax assessment for an inordinate period of time. Califor-
nia attorneys should beware the fiture structuring of like-kind exchanges;for
the amendment revises the lenient procedures for like-kind qualification
sanctioned by the permissive Ninth Circuit.
I. INTRODUCTION-THE PROBLEM
Trudy Taxpayer grew bored with her miniature golf establishment
in Encino. She learned from reliable sources that the tempestuous
weather threatening the Malibu coastline every winter had created a
great demand for sand bags among the residents. Eager to delve into
the new venture, Trudy contacted Bernie Broker, who promised to
find someone willing to trade an oceanfront lot for her miniature golf
course. Bernie located Edward Exchangee, III, whose life-long dream
was to own a miniature golf course in Encino, but who, alas, owned
no oceanfront property. Edward wanted to take immediate posses-
sion of the miniature golf operation and promised to find Trudy a
suitable sand-filled lot.
Trudy comes to you, a California tax attorney, for advice regarding
the tax consequences of the contemplated deal. You are thus con-
fronted with the complexities of a like-kind exchange; a transaction
whereby business and investment properties are traded, rather than
sold, resulting in a deferral of taxable gain. Section 1031 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, which governs like-kind exchanges, has been
amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.1 The amendment al-
ters the procedures for successful deferral of gain realized in an ex-
change. This article analyzes the amended section 1031, and
examines the consequences of the amendment with a view to its im-
pact on the California practitioner.
1. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 77, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 595-596 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1031).
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY UNDERLYING SECTION 1031
The concept of tax deferral for exchanges of like-kind property
first appeared in section 202 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1921.2
Its stated purpose was to encourage investment by allowing deferral
of tax "for those exchanges or 'trades' in which, although a technical
'gain' may be realized under the present law, the taxpayer actually
realizes no cash profit."3
After a flurry of amendments in 1923, 1924, and 1939, section 202
evolved into section 1031 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.4 Codifi-
cation of like-kind exchanges represents an exception to the general
rule that gain or loss on exchange of property shall be recognized.5
Section 1031, therefore, allows the taxpayer to defer any gain until
actually realized in cash or other taxable disposition.6
To qualify for nonrecognition of gain or loss under section 1031, the
taxpayer must demonstrate compliance with the following require-
ments: 1) the taxpayer must hold and receive property for productive
use in trade or business or for investment;7 2) the taxpayer's property
2. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, tit. II, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921). Section
202(c) provided that gain or loss would not be recognized in a like-kind exchange un-
less property received by the taxpayer had "a readily realizable market value." Id.
Section 202 was modified in 1924 because of the difficulties inherent in applying the
"readily realizable market value" test. See Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269
F.2d 453, 454-56 (2d Cir. 1959), for a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history
behind section 1031.
3. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
4. I.R.C. § 202(c)(1) (1921), amended by I.R.C. § 203 (1924), amended by I.R.C.
§§ 112(b)(1), (c)(1), (e), 113(a)(6) (1939), amended by I.R.C. § 1031 (1954) (amended
1984).
5. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982). Section 1001(c) states: "Except as otherwise provided in
this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on
the sale or exchange of property shall be recognized." Id. § 1001(c). Please note that
section 1031 is not an elective provision. Therefore, if the transaction is deemed a like-
kind exchange, loss as well as gain will not be recognized. I.R.C. § 1031(c) (West Supp.
1984).
6. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (West Supp. 1984). Deferred exchanges have frequently been
labeled "tax-free exchanges." In actuality, tax liability is not eliminated; it is merely
deferred until subsequent disposition. Like-kind exchanges may result in a tax-free
transaction should the property remain with the taxpayer until his death, at which
time it would pass through his estate to his heirs or devisees. Since, by definition, the
taxpayer's basis on the date of his death is equal to the fair market value of the prop-
erty, there is no taxable gain to the heirs or devisees. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1982).
7. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (West Supp. 1984). Courts have deemed a variety of properties
as held for productive use in trade or business or for investment. See, e.g., Starker v.
United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) (timberland traded for contract right to
receive property in the future was considered like-kind because contract right was
found to be the equivalent of a fee interest in land); R.A. Farish, 14 T.C.M. (P-H)
45,056 (1945) (machinery traded for construction equipment); see also National Out-
door Adv. Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937) (cars and trucks used by
company employees to locate advertising space exchanged for new cars and trucks).
The phrase "for productive use in business" has been held to contemplate any use "es-
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must be exchanged solely for property of a like-kind;8 3) the tax-
payer must display an intent to exchange, not to sell and reinvest;9
and 4) the taxpayer must assure that his property is not one of the
intangible properties specifically excluded by the statute.10
The tax advantages offered by section 103), compelled many tax-
payers to seek like-kind exchanges. However, locating a person both
interested in an exchange and owning property desireable to the tax-
payer often proved to be an arduous task. As a result, taxpayers be-
gan to stretch section 1031 to its limits through the use of multi-party
sential to commerce or manufacture; that is, to the performance of services, as well as
to the creation of material things." Id at 880.
Properties are not held for use in trade or business or for investment if they are
held primarily for resale or for personal use. See, e.g., Regals Realty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 127 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1942) (nonrecognition of gain denied when property re-
ceived in exchange was offered for resale); Black v. Conmissioner, 35 T.C. 90 (1960)
(nonrecognition of gain denied when property offered in exchange was not held for
productive use in business or for investment, but was held for sale).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b), T.D. 6935, 1967, 32 Fed. Reg. 15,822 (Nov. 17, 1967)
states: "Unproductive real estate held by one other than a dealer for future use or fu-
ture realization of the increment in value is held for investment and not primarily for
sale." Further, Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(a), T.D. 6936, 1967, 32 Fed. Reg. 15,822 (Nov.
17, 1967) (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(a)-i (1984)), in pertinent part provides:
"[P]roperty held for productive use in trade or business may be exchanged for prop-
erty held for investment. Similarly, property held for investment may be exchanged
for property held for productive use in trade or business."
8. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (West Supp. 1984).
[Tihe words "like-kind" have reference to the nature or character of the prop-
erty and not to its grade or quality. One kind or class of property may not,
under that section, be exchanged for property of a different kind or class. The
fact that any real estate involved is improved or unimproved is not material,
for that fact relates only to the grade or quality of the property and not to its
kind or class.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b), T.D. 6935, 1967, 32 Fed. Reg, 15,822 (Nov. 17, 1967) (codi-
fied at 26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(a)-i (1984)). The regulation illustrates this concept with ex-
amples such as an exchange of a used truck for a new truck, or city real estate for a
ranch or farm. Id,
9. Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1.980) (nonrecognition of gain
allowed on exchange involving four parties because each leg of the transaction was
part of a single, integrated plan); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.
1963) (nonrecognition allowed on exchange of property for an obligation to acquire
property since escrow agreement demonstrated intent to exchange). These cases rep-
resent the proposition that intent not only refers to the subjective desires of the tax-
payer, but may be inferred from the overall result of the transaction.
10. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (West Supp. 1984). Intangible properties excluded under sec-
tion 1031(a)(2) are: "(A) stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale, (B)
stocks, bonds or notes, (C) other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest,
(D) interests in a partnership, (E) certificates of trust or beneficial interests, or (F)
choses in action."
For a detailed explanation of section 1031's statutory requirements, see generally R.
GOODMAN, REAL PROPERTY EXCHANGES 19-57 (1982).
1131
and delayed exchanges.'
III. THE STARKER CASE AND THE DELAYED EXCHANGE
A delayed or nonsimultaneous exchange occurs where the transfer
of the "target property" for the taxpayer's property does not take
place at the same time. This concept reached its extreme in Starker
v. United States,'2 where the Ninth Circuit held that a five year de-
lay in the transfer of the target property qualified for like-kind
treatment.1 3
In the Starker case, as illustrated by the Trudy Taxpayer hypothet-
ical, Starker transferred legal title and possession to Crown
Zellerbach Corporation in exchange for a contract right to receive
property to be designated by Starker in the future.14 The Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that the Starker scenario qualified as a permissible
like-kind exchange on the ground that the policy of section 1031 is to
prevent inequity by: 1) deferring consideration of tax liability until
the value of the exchange property is made certain by its subsequent
sale and, 2) deferring collection of tax revenue until the taxpayer has
"cashed in" on his investment in trade or business property.' 5
Congress flatly rejected the interpretation that the policy underly-
ing section 1031 necessitated deferral of the valuation problem, stat-
ing: "[T]he transferred property must be valued at a specific or near-
specific dollar amount in order to determine the aggregate value of
the properties that the taxpayer may receive in the future. Thus, the
taxpayer's gain may be measured with reasonable accuracy in the
year of the original transfer."16
Congress also rejected the presumption that section 1031 permitted
deferral of taxation because the taxpayer had not yet "cashed in" on
his investment.17 The underlying policy of section 1031 is to defer
imposition of tax on the gain from the original investment only when
11. Goldstein & Lewis, Tax Treatment of Like-Kind Exchanges of Property Used
in a Trade or Business or for Investment, 5 REV. TAx'N OF INDMDUALS, 195, 252
(1981).
12. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
13. Id. at 1355.
14. Id, at 1342-43.
15. Id at 1352. The Starker court noted:
The legislative history reveals that the provision was designed to avoid the im-
position of a tax on those who do not "cash in" on their investments in trade
or business property. Congress appeared to be concerned that taxpayers
would not have the cash to pay a tax on the capital gain if the exchange trig-
gered recognition.
Id. Although an apparent consideration of the drafters of the section was the difficulty
of valuing property exchanged for the purpose of measuring gain or loss, it was not
seen by the court as the controlling consideration in the enactment of section 1031. Id.
16. H.R. REP. No. 432 (Part II), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1232-33 (1984).
17. Id. at 1233.
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it remains "tied up in a continuing investment of the same sort."18
Although the Starker court made due mention of the "continuing in-
vestment rationale," the effect of its final holding was contrary to
this principle.19 A long-term delay, such as that sanctioned by
Starker, fails to accommodate the annual accounting requirement of
the code by allowing the tax consequences of the transaction to re-
main uncertain.20
IV. 'THE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 1031
The Ninth Circuit's permissiveness toward delayed exchanges
prompted Congress to amend section 1031 to permit only those par-
ties continuing their investment in similar property to delay for a
statutorily prescribed period of time.21 Although section 1031 does
not specifically require simultaneous transfer of the exchanged
properties, substantial delay in identifying and exchanging the target
property causes procedural and administrative uncertainty. During
an "open-ended exchange," circumstances may require the taxpayer
to shift his investment to non-like-kind property or to accept a par-
tial exchange with the remaining balance paid in cash, making appro-
priate tax treatment problematic. Further, the Internal Revenue
Service may encounter difficulty collecting the tax on the delayed
partial exchange if the statute of limitations has expired. 22
Concerned by the prospect of the taxpayer receiving non-like-kind
property during the lag time between transfers,23 Congress amended
section 1031 to limit the Starker loophole.24 The amendment requires
that the target property be identified within forty-five days of receipt
of the taxpayer's property and received within the earlier of the fol-
lowing two time periods: 180 days of the initial transfer, or by the due
18. Jordan Marsh Co., 269 F.2d at 456.
19. Starker, 602 F.2d at 1352.
20. I.R.C. § 6072 (1982). This section indicates that tax must be reported on an an-
nual basis. See Feder, Starker: The Deferred Tax-Free Exchange Resurrected 7 J. OF
REAL EsTATE TAX'N 218, 228-31 (1979-80) for elaboration on the administrative difficul-
ties caused by the delayed exchange upheld in the Starker case.
21. H.R. REP. No. 432 (Part II), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1232 (1984). See infra note 87
and accompanying text for a description of the time period imposed by amended sec-
tion 1031.
22. I.R.C. §§ 6501-6504 (1982). These sections cover the various statutes of limita-
tions relating to tax collection. The applicable statute of limitations will depend to a
large degree on the facts of each particular case.
23. H.R. REP. No. 432 (Part II), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1232'(1984).
24. I.R.C. § 1031 (West Supp. 1984) (amending I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1982)).
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date of the transferor's return.25 The new section 1031(a), therefore,
eliminates the "open-ended" exchange adopted in Starker.
V. COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW SECTION 1031: ADVICE TO THE
PRACTITIONER
The far-reaching effects of the amended section 1031 pose potential
problems and strategy changes for the real estate broker, the land
speculator, the title insurance company, the accountant and, of
course, the practicing tax attorney. Two new requirements demand
immediate attention by the practitioner: 1) the identification require-
ment, and 2) the exchange completion requirement.
A. Dealing with the Identification Requirement
Congress has set forth few guidelines regarding the identification
requirement. As a result, three aspects of the amendment open to in-
terpretation are: 1) the actual length of the identification period; 2)
steps necessary to attain "identified property" status; and 3) multi-
property designations.
1. Length of the Identification Requirement
Compliance with the identification requirement of the newly-
amended section requires that the taxpayer designate the target
property "before the day which is 45 days after the date on which the
taxpayer transfers the property relinquished in the exchange." 26 In
actuality, this allows the taxpayer only forty-four days after the ini-
tial transfer to identify the target property. The conference report
relating to the amendment indicates that a forty-five day time period
was intended.27 However, until a technical correction is made to sec-
tion 1031(a)(3)(A), the practitioner should make sure that his taxpay-
25. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (West Supp. 1984). This subsection provides:
(3) Requirement that property be identified and that exchange be completed
not more than 180 days after transfer of exchanged property. -For purposes
of this subsection, any property received by the taxpayer shall be treated as
property which is not like-kind property if -
(A) such property is not identified as property to be received in the ex-
change before the day which is 45 days after the date on which the taxpayer
transfers the property relinquished in the exchange, or
(B) such property is received after the earlier of -
(i) the day which is 180 days after the date on which the taxpayer trans-
fers the property relinquished in the exchange, or
(ii) the due date (determined with regard to extension) for the trans-
feror's return of the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year in
which the transfer of the relinquished property occurs.
Id.
26. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1984).
27. H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 866 (1984), where the Conference Re-
port states that "transferors are permitted 45 days after the transfer to designate the
property to be received ......
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ing client identifies the target property by the forty-fourth, and not
the forty-fifth, day after the original transfer.28
2. "Identified Property" Status
The language of the amendment fails to delineate the necessary
procedure for identifying property. The House Conference Report
suggests that this requirement may be satisfied by designating the
target property in a written contract between the parties.29 Prior to
inclusion of the identification requirement, case law indicated that an
oral understanding would qualify an exchange for section 1031 treat-
ment if the parties intended to effectuate an exchange, and such ex-
change actually occurred.30 The Conference Report did not specify
designation in a written contract as the sole method of compliance.31
Apparently, Congress' intention was to provide evidentiary assurance
of a continuing investment in like-kind property, most likely barring
the efficacy of oral agreements. As a practical matter, therefore, at-
torneys should counsel their clients to remain within the safe harbor
offered by contractual designation until regulations or further case
law settle this issue.
3. Multi-Property Designation
The third aspect of the amendment open to interpretation involves
multi-property designation. This allows the taxpayer to identify
more than one parcel of property, subject to final selection between
these alternatives, at a date subsequent to expiration of the forty-five
day period. According to the House Conference Report, the proper-
ties initially selected must be limited in number, and the property ul-
timately designated must be identified as a result of "contingencies
beyond the control of both parties."3 2 The report suggests that bas-
ing the selection upon approval of zoning changes would constitute a
"contingency beyond the control of both parties."3 3 However, it re-
28. Levine & McCormick, 61-4th Tax Free Exchanges Under § 1031, Tax Mgmt.
Portfolio, Nov. 12, 1984, at 54.
29. H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 866 (1984).
30. See Starker, 602 F.2d at 1355; Franklin B. Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d
1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980); Arthur E. and Glenda Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134
(1980). The Brauer court noted: "We believe it is immaterial that the parties only
orally agreed to effect an exchange since, 'tax consequences must depend on what was
actually intended.'" Id. at 1141.
31. H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 866 (1984).
32. Id.
33. Id, The Conference Report provides this illustration: "For example, if A
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mains to be seen what other contingencies would qualify. The prac-
ticing attorney would be well advised to be wary of contingencies
contractually determined in advance by the parties.34 In light of the
zoning approval example given in the House Conference Report as
indicated above, it appears that Congress intended the contingencies
to be determined by impartial, uninvolved third parties, such as state
or federal administrative agencies.
The identification requirement may prove to be an unwanted addi-
tion to section 1031. It has the potential of reducing the efficiency of
legitimate multi-party exchanges by forcing exchange participants
unable to locate suitable exchange property to postpone the ex-
change, thereby risking the loss of a potential buyer requiring imme-
diate possession of the relinquished property.
B. The Exchange Completion Requirement
Section 1031(a)(3)(B) provides that the taxpayer must receive the
target property by the earlier of 180 days after the initial transfer or
the due date of the transferor's tax return to qualify for like-kind
transferred real estate in exchange for a promise by B to transfer property 1 to A if
zoning changes are approved and property 2 if they are not, the exchange would qual-
ify for like-kind treatment." Id
34. The Conference Report fails to supply any indicia to determine which events
qualify as "contingencies beyond the control of both parties." Great potential for abuse
arises when parties are free to contemplate events which artificially create contingen-
cies beyond their control. Consider the situation in which the parties contract that if
the Dodgers win the World Series, they will select Property A and if not, they will
select Property B.
Although Congress remained silent as to the reason for requiring contingencies to be
beyond the control of both parties, the probable intent was to prevent illegitimate use
of multi-property designation to circumvent the identification deadline. Multi-prop-
erty designation operates as an escape hatch for parties not able to forecast in advance
the outcome of events, such as zoning, which materially affect the contract. Appar-
ently, the provision was adopted to inject flexibility into the arbitrarily imposed identi-
fication requirement.
Congress may also have intended that the contingency bear a reasonable relation
either to the agreement between the parties or to the exchanged properties. However,
a reasonable relation test is not, by itself, sufficiently broad to thwart abuse. Consider
a contract which bases selection between the alternative properties on fluctuations in
the properties' market value. Although this event meets both the "reasonable rela-
tion" and "beyond the control" tests, it is no less arbitrary than basing the selection on
the winner of the World Series.
See Levine & McCormick, supra note 91, at 55. Here, the commentators indicate
that use of property value fluctuations as a contingency may not qualify under the
amended statute since the manner of designation reduces the taxpayer's investment
risk and, thus, contradicts the continuity of investment rationale underlying section
1031. Id The potential to abuse proper selection of a contingency suggests that the
commentators' concern is well-founded, regardless of whether the Internal Revenue
Service speculates as to the degree of taxpayer risk incurred or confines itself to the
collection of taxable revenue. Until Congress provides guidelines to clarify the mean-
ing of "contingencies beyond the control of both parties," the practitioner may be well
advised to seek a private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service.
1136
[Vol. 12: 1115, 1985] California Practicum
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
treatment.35 This "exchange completion" requirement lays to rest
many issues debated in case law and, at the same time, limits the va-
riety of tax planning devices previously available under section 1031.
Tax planners should beware structuring an exchange in connection
with: 1) constructive receipt of cash, 2) construction agreements, and
3) installment payments.
1. Avoid Constructive Receipt of Cash
The amendment's 180-day time limit on completion of the ex-
change forces the taxpayer to elect early on whether to accept prop-
erty or cash in return for his property. Any receipt of cash during
the exchange period will disqualify an otherwise valid exchange. Dis-
qualification results because, as a matter of definition, actual or con-
structive receipt of money by the taxpayer transforms the exchange
into a taxable sale.36 Constructive receipt of cash occurs, for example,
when the taxpayer has the ability to access cash placed in an account
by the transferor to secure the exchange transaction. To avoid a find-
ing of constructive receipt, the attorney should carefully draft in-
structions curtailing the taxpayer's ability to access such an account.
When drafting an exchange agreement, the attorney should specify
in writing that it is the parties' intention to effectuate an exchange,
not a sale, and that any right to pay cash in lieu of an exchange re-
35. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1984). The text of the amendment states
that once the taxpayer has relinquished his property, the target property must be re-
ceived by the earlier of 180 days or the due date of the transferor's return (including
extensions). In most instances, 180 days will be the statutory maximum since parties
wishing to exchange near the close of their taxable year can obtain a six-month exten-
sion of time to file their tax return. I.R.C. § 6081 (1982) offers taxpayers an automatic
four-month extension of time to file their tax return. To obtain the extension, the tax-
payer need only estimate the tax owed for the year on Form 4868 and include payment
of the estimated tax when the form is filed. Form 2688 provides an additional two-
month extension which will be granted upon a showing of good reason and prior use of
the automatic four-month extension. If additional extensions are required, the attor-
ney may wish to peruse section 6081 to see if his client qualifies for any of the special
extension rules available for certain taxpayers.
36. Starker, 602 F.2d at 1354. Cf. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.
1967). The Starker case, deciding an issue unaffected by the amendment and repre-
senting current law, held that the right to receive cash was permissible under section
1031 because the transferor, not the taxpayer, could elect to pay cash if suitable ex-
change property could not be located. In Carlton, the taxpayer retained the right to
demand cash at any time and was disqualified from like-kind treatment because the
cash in lieu provision was considered constructive receipt of cash.
For a more complete explanation of the constructive receipt doctrine and an analysis
of applicable case law, see Goldstein & Lewis, supra note 74, at 258-66. For a discus-
sion on the avoidance of constructive receipt of cash when using an escrow or trust, see
id. at 278-82.
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mains within the sole discretion of the transferor.3 7 Further, any es-
crow or trust used to secure the transaction should contain
substantial restrictions on the taxpayer's right to receive cash. Such
restrictions include no right to demand specific performance, no right
to interest accruing in the account, and no right to payment from the
fund in the event of default.38 In essence, the taxpayer's only right
of access to the funds should be as a creditor with the qualification
that the funds in default must be used to purchase like-kind prop-
erty. Otherwise, the exchange will be labeled a sale and lose its tax-
deferred status.
2. Construction Agreements
The attorney should also proceed with caution when drafting a
construction agreement in connection with an exchange. Under such
agreements, the transferor acquires land and constructs a building or
other improvement desired by the taxpayer.3 9 In California, the
transferor bears the risk of loss until the taxpayer takes possession
or has legal title.40 Since the amendment requires transfer of title to
the taxpayer within 180 days of the initial exchange, the attorney
may wish to contractually allocate the risk of loss to the transferor in
the event construction cannot be completed in the time allotted.
3. Use of Installment Payments in a Like-Kind Exchange
The exchange completion requirement forecloses the taxpayer's
option to receive cash and elect installment sale treatment when an
exchange proves unsuccessful several years after the initial trans-
fer.41 Under the installment rules embodied in section 453 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, the taxpayer pays tax solely on installments
received per taxable year.42 Often, these rules will produce a more
favorable tax result than the exchange rules. However, if exchange
treatment is contemplated, the attorney should closely examine the
tax consequences of each rule and unequivocally indicate which rule
37. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
38. Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-1 C.B. 179. This ruling states that the escrowed funds
should remain unavailable to the taxpayer at all times and under all circumstances.
However, escrow instructions stating that, in the event of default, the funds may be
used to purchase property selected by the taxpayer would probably not disqualify the
exchange from like-kind treatment.
39. Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 332. The ruling indicates that the exchange will
remain tax-deferred as long as the purchaser constructs the improvement on his own
behalf and not as the taxpayer's agent. The purchaser, on the other hand, can never
receive tax-deferred treatment under this fact pattern since the property he acquired
was not held for use in trade or business or for investment. Bloomington Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 19 T.C.M. (P-H) 50,189 (1950), affd, 189 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1951).
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1662 (West 1973).
41. Levine & McCormick, supra note 91, at 56.
42. Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 § 2, I.R.C. § 453 (1982).
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has been chosen. Any uncertainty shrouding the taxpayer's intent
may cause the exchange to lose its tax-deferred status because of the
taxpayer's potential to receive cash.43
The exchange completion requirement has not fully foreclosed the
possibility of using sections 1031 and 453 in tandem.44 The exchange
and installment rules may still be profitably combined in a "partially
tax-deferred exchange." A "partially tax-deferred exchange" occurs
when the properties exchanged are of unequal value and "boot" is re-
ceived to equalize the difference. "Boot" may consist of cash, mort-
gages, notes or other property, and serves to compensate for the
discrepancy in price. Generally, "boot" is taxed as ordinary income.
However, section 453 permits the taxpayer to defer most of the tax
attributable to "boot" by electing to pay the "boot" in installments.45
To use section 1031 and 453 in tandem, the attorney should bifurcate
the transaction so that the exchange rules apply to defer tax on the
property received, and the installment rules apply to defer tax on
any "boot" received.
VI. EFFECTIVE DATES OF THE AMENDMENT
The Deficit Reduction Act provides that the identification and ex-
change requirements of section 1031 in its amended form apply to
transfers after the date of enactment, July 18, 1984.46 Transfers oc-
curring on or before July 18, 1984 must be completed before Decem-
ber 1, 1986 to receive like-kind treatment, unless the parties
designated the exchange property in a binding contract entered into
before June 14, 1984 and the property so designated is received on or
before December 31, 1988. Any tax deficiency occurring as a result of
the exchange's failure to qualify as like-kind may be assessed until
January 1, 1988.
VII. SUMMARY
The codification of like-kind exchanges in section 1031 of the Inter-
43. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conse-
quences ensuing from receipt of cash during an exchange.
44. "IT]he term payment ... shall not include any property permitted to be re-
ceived in . .. [a like-kind] exchange without recognition of gain," thereby sanctioning
the use of sections 453 and 1031 in combination to allow the taxpayer to pay tax on any
'toot" received in installments. I.R.C. § 453(f)(6)(C) (1982).
45. I.R.C. § 453B(a)(1) (1982).
46. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 77(a)(3); 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 494, 595-596 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1031).
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nal Revenue Code presents an exception to the general rule that gain
or loss on an exchange of property shall be recognized. This rule was
soon stretched to its limits by sophisticated taxpayers who forestalled
taxation by delaying their exchange for an indefinite period of time.
The controversy surrounding delayed exchanges prompted Congress
to tighten the Starker loophole by adding a time element to section
1031.
The amendment itself, however, begets as many problems for the
practitioner as it solves. The time period imposed by the amendment
increases the likelihood of constructively receiving cash. Its brevity
also makes precarious the use of like-kind exchanges in tandem with
construction agreements and installment payments. As a result, the
practitioner must closely scrutinize the form of the like-kind ex-
change to ensure that it punctiliously meets both the identification
and exchange completion requirements.
Armed with this knowledge of the amended section 1031, you are
now equipped to handle the intricacies of Trudy's contemplated ex-
change. With due care in structuring the exchange, Trudy can meet
the deadline for identification and exchange, and commence operat-
ing her business to save the Malibu coastline.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Section 1031 as amended promises to have far-reaching implica-
tions with regard to like-kind exchanges of property in California.
Taxpayers and their attorneys should be aware that loopholes ex-
isting under the Ninth Circuit's Starker decision have been tightened
by time limitations enacted under the amendment. Many ambiguities
persist in the amended section, therefore, prudence is advised until
regulations are promulgated to clarify Congress' intention.
LAUREL A. TOLLMAN*
I would like to acknowledge Michael Gradisher whose creative input helped to
shape the format and literary style of this Cal Practicum.
1140
